The Diminishing Power and Democracy of Hong Kong: An Analysis of Hong Kong\u27s Umbrella Movement and the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement by Kuang, Xiao Lin
Portland State University 
PDXScholar 
University Honors Theses University Honors College 
Summer 2021 
The Diminishing Power and Democracy of Hong 
Kong: An Analysis of Hong Kong's Umbrella 
Movement and the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment 
Bill Movement 
Xiao Lin Kuang 
Portland State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/honorstheses 
 Part of the Asian Studies Commons, and the Other International and Area Studies Commons 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Kuang, Xiao Lin, "The Diminishing Power and Democracy of Hong Kong: An Analysis of Hong Kong's 
Umbrella Movement and the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement" (2021). University Honors 
Theses. Paper 1126. 
https://doi.org/10.15760/honors.1157 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in University Honors 
Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more 
accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu. 
 
The diminishing power and democracy of Hong Kong: an analysis of Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement 
and the Anti-extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement 
 
by 
Xiao Lin Kuang 
 
 
An undergraduate honors thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the degree of 

















The diminishing power and democracy of Hong Kong  Kuang 1 
Abstract 
The future of Hong Kong – one of the most valuable economic port cities in the world – has been 
a key political issue since the Opium Wars (1839—1860). After eight five years of being a British 
colony, Hong Kong was returned to mainland China in 1997 under a special arrangement that 
was intended to preserve Hong Kong’s special political and administrative status until 2047. As 
Hong Kong is a special administered zone, it utilizes a democratic governing system and enjoys 
freedoms that mainlander citizens of China do not experience. Many scholars have warned 
Hong Kong of its dire position politically as China continues to open up the mainland for foreign 
businesses. In this thesis, I argue that China never intended to honor the agreement of 
democracy with Hong Kong until 2047, as Hong Kong is can only be as politically troublesome as 
it is economically useful to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Through the analysis of China’s 
increasing political presence in Hong Kong, the diminishing freedoms of Hong Kong people, and 
the lack of Hong Kong’s economic success in both the gross domestic product (GDP) and stock 
market exchange platforms in comparison to the mainland, I found that Hong Kong is no longer 
as important to the Chinese government as it once was during the 1997 turnover. Hong Kong 
waited too long to attempt to break free from communist rule. Hong Kong’s title as a global 
financial hub will likely not give the island any advantage over the mainland cities nor will it 
receive any more favoritism from the CCP. China will continue to bring Hong Kong in line with 
the rest of the country and as a result, Hong Kong’s freedoms as well as its special administered 
zone status can cease to exist completely in the future. 
Keywords: Hong Kong, Hong Kong 2019 Protest, Umbrella Movement, Anti-Extradition Law 
Amendment Bill Movement, Hong Kong prodemocracy, China special economic zones (SEZs)  
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Introduction 
 Hong Kong has been under political conflict since the Opium Wars and the Unequal Treaty Era 
(1839—1899), as the island went from a Qing Dynasty port city to British eastern colony (1842—1997), 
and finally a special administrative zone of China’s Communist Party (CCP) (1997—present) (Hoare, 
2000). While Hong Kong does belong to the CCP, the special administered zone utilizes a democratic 
governing system and enjoys freedoms that mainlander citizens of China do not experience, such as 
freedom of speech and press. These characteristic sets Hong Kong as one of the most valuable and 
popular economic port cities in the world to investors. Learning from the success of Hong Kong and 
Taiwan, the CCP opened up the mainland for foreign businesses as well. After analyzing China’s 
economic plan, many scholars have warned Hong Kong of its dire position politically when China’s 
economic power outshines that of Hong Kong’s someday. That time of such an economic power 
dynamic has arrived for Hong Kong. Understanding the weak political position of Hong Kong in 2021 is 
crucial for several reasons. First, Hong Kong is not only a crucial world financial hub for many western 
superpowers (i.e. United States (US)), but is the only Chinese city to have strong relations with foreign 
nations (i.e. Britain (UK)). Second, it is the only city in China to have access to information outside of 
China’s Great (Internet) Firewall (without a virtual private network (VPN)), which means the city is less 
likely to have propaganda influences. Third, the governing system of Hong Kong is democratic and gives 
the people freedoms not enjoyed by the rest of China. This is a key attractor for foreign business 
investors and can easily affect the development and value of global companies—not just western ones. 
Fourth, Hong Kong’s success or failure of democracy is a key factor in how China reflects itself as an 
official superpower to the rest of the world. In light of recent and ongoing protests for autonomy and 
the preservation of democracy, Hong Kong has shown to reach a stage of no return, in other words, 
Hong Kong will continue to face more freedoms taken away by this power dynamic, while those 
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freedoms already taken would not be returned. China will truly be a single political party with no 
interference from western countries and become a recognized superpower.  
 To explore these issues, first, I will provide a background on the Opium Wars and Hong Kong’s 
governing system in comparison to mainland China’s communist system. Following the background, I 
explain my methods of research as well as a literature review. The literature review consists of an 
analysis of the democratic differences between Taiwan and Hong Kong, Hong Kong’s democratization 
challenges with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the necessity of Hong Kong to keep its political 
independence. My thesis is that China never intended to honor the agreement of democracy with Hong 
Kong until 2047 and Hong Kong waited too long to attempt to break free from communist rule. In 
support of this argument, I first examine China’s increasing political presence in Hong Kong, then the 
diminishing freedoms of Hong Kong people, and finally Hong Kong’s gross domestic product (GDP) and 
stock market exchange platforms in comparison to the mainland. I conclude with a consideration of 
Hong Kong’s diminishing freedoms and lack of economic success in comparison to the mainland, that 
Hong Kong is no longer as powerful nor as important to the Chinese government as it was at the time of 
the handover. The democracy of Hong Kong can and will be erased by the CCP in time.  
Background 
Opium Wars and the era of Unequal Treaties 
While British Imperialism began earlier than the nineteenth century, one of the greatest global 
trade expansions was during that time. The British, French, and Spanish led fleets to conquer new 
colonies and extract wealth. As trade brought beneficial discoveries to the imperial powers, it also 
created centuries of damage to conquered cultures and societies. An important case-in-point is that of 
the Opium Wars between China and Great Britain. After the First Opium War, from September 4th, 1839, 
to August 29, 1842, Britain forced China to sign the Treaty of Nanjing, which ceded the island of Hong 
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Kong to the British. The British colony flourished as an East-West trading center, commercial gateway, 
and distribution center. Hong Kong made an excellent easy access port for the British traders to connect 
with East-West traders from various East Asian countries. Hong Kong served as a colony so well that 
after the Second Opium War (June 28th, 1856 to October 18th, 1860), Britain decided they wanted the 
island longer and in 1898, under the Second Convention of Peking, China was forced to cede the 
Kowloon Peninsula, adjacent to Hong Kong Island, along with other area islands to Britain for an 
additional ninety-nine years of ruling (History.com Editors, 2010). It wasn’t until September of 1984, 
after years of negotiation between the two nations, that the British agreed to sign a formal agreement 
for the 1997 turn-over of Hong Kong in exchange for the pledge of allowing Hong Kong to keep its 
capitalist system and democratic political structure (people have to right to vote for government 
representatives). At midnight on July 1st, 1997, Hong Kong was finally peaceably returned to China after 
156 years. The problem of returning a long-lost child such as Hong Kong was that it no longer recognized 
the authority of its ‘mother’. Citizen of Hong Kong and mainland China saw each other as distant 
relatives. Hong Kong people saw the Mainlanders as uncivilized beings and the mainland to be less 
developed than the island. This could be due to a social norm introduced by the British Imperialists or 
that Hong Kong people viewed that the advantage of Hong Kong’s rapid economic growth and urban 
development meant their status is also above the mainland people. In addition, many Hong Kong people 
have gotten used to the governing system of democracy rather than communism, which led some Hong 
Kong people to believe that China’s governing system is not as advanced as that of Hong Kong’s (Wang 
and Dong, 2021).  
To understand the pollical disconnect between Hong Kong and mainland China, we also need to 
look to China’s tumultuous history. When Hong Kong was ‘given’ to Britain in 1842 and again in 1898, 
China was still under the rule of the Qing Dynasty. The Qing Empire ruled China from 1644 to 1912, with 
the last emperor, Puyi, being overthrown by the Chinese Revolution or also known as the Xinhai 
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Revolution in 1911. As a result, on January 1st, 1912, the Republic of China was established. Immediately 
following World War II, China had an internal political war between two parties, the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) and the Nationalist Party (as known as Kuomintang (KMT)) (Office of the Historian, 2021). 
This political war that preceded on and off since the 1920’s finally ended by Mao Zedong, the Chinese 
Communist leader, in 1949. This Chinese milestone that ended the political war came to be known as 
The Chinese Revolution of 1949. Based on a single political party system grounded in Marxist and based 
initially on the Soviet principles of a communist state, Mao Zedong, the founding father of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), redefined China’s agriculture and industrial system (The Editors of 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2020).  
In December 1978, Deng Xiaoping, the successor to Mao, shifted away from Mao’s vision of a 
“Red China” and created the new Open-Door Policy that allowed foreign business to set up in China, 
which became the turning point in China’s economic future as the “world’s factory” (Bajpai, 2021). Since 
the Open-Door Policy enacted, the Chinese economy has grown aggressively, as a result of export-led 
growth and with the support of the CCP and the Chinese state apparatus (van Kemenade, 1998). Then, 
affter forty-eight years of communist rule, China reclaimed Hong Kong Island from Britain. The transition 
has been rocky and filled with uncertainty for the citizens of Hong Kong; as can be seen by the large 
number of pro-democracy protests both before and since the 1997 handover.  These democracy 
protests include: the Tiananmen Solidarity Protests (1989), Anti-Article 23 Protest (also known as The 
July 1 Protest Rally) (2003), the Anti-moral and National Education Movement (2012), the Umbrella 
Movement (2014), and the most recent Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement (also known as 
the 2019 Protest) (2019- 2021). Of the protests mentioned above only the Anti-Article 23 Protest and 
the Anti-moral and National Education Movement had been successful (Duhalde and Huang, 2019). The 
Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement’s success or failure is still yet to be determined, but the 
chance for success is low. Since China had no intentions of giving Hong Kong the freedoms it had under 
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the British rule, Hong Kong remains only as important as its economic importance is to China. For the 
purpose of being concise, I briefly review the significance of the Anti-Article 23 Protest in the literature 
review section, while in the research section I use the two most recent democracy protests of Hong 
Kong, the Umbrella Movement (2014) and Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement (2019- 
2021), to analyze this economic power dynamic between China and Hong Kong.  
Hong Kong’s governing system 
Of course, to understand the difference between the communist governing system in the PRC 
and Hong Kong’s democratic governing system is it necessary to first analyze how the island’s governing 
body is organized. While Hong Kong was a Britain colony, the island was administered by a governor, 
who was appointed by, and represented, Britain’s monarch. The governor directed the government and 
served as the commander in chief as he presided over the Executive Council and the Legislative Council 
(Britannica, 2020). Under the constitutional agreement signed by both countries, the Basic Law, Hong 
Kong is to be administered as an autonomous Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s 
Republic of China except in the case of defense and foreign affairs. Britain’s hope was that this special 
authority for Hong Kong would help the island people to adjust slowly back into Chinese rule. Hong 
Kong’s autonomous status as a SAR was to last for 50 years (until 2047)—following the handover in 
1997. The two-tiered system allows a representative government to exist with an independent judiciary 
(GovHK, 2020). 
The Chief Executive, head of the HK SAR, is elected by a broadly representative Election 
Community which is appointed by the Central People’s Government (Mainland China). The Executive 
Council serves no longer than the Chief Executive’s term of office, assists the Chief Executive in 
policymaking, and comprises 16 principle officials and 16 non-official members. These members are 
appointed by the Chief Executive, members of the Legislative Council, and public figures. The HK 
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government’s main administrative and executive functions of government are carried out by 13 policy 
bureau and 56 departs which employs approximately 174,900 people (4.4 percent of the HK workforce). 
The law-making body of the SAR is the Legislative Council that consists of 70 members of which 35 are 
directly elected by geographical constituencies and the other 35 elected by functional constituencies. 
However as of May 27, 2021, Hong Kong's legislature passed an electoral reform bill that allowed Beijing 
more power to appoint and remove lawmakers on Hong Kong's legislative council, while reducing the 
number of seats elected by the public. Hong Kong’s legislature now has 90 total seats of which 40 are 
elected by a pro-Beijing committee and only 20 seats to be directly voted by the public (DW News, 
2021). With 20 seats, the public can vote less than a quarter of the total seats in the legislative council. 
The Legislative Council’s purpose is to debate issues of public interest, examine budgets, debate the 
Chief Executive’s policies, endorse the appointment and removal of the judges of the Court of Final 
Appeal and the Chief Judge of the High Court. HK is split into 18 districts with 458 members on the 
District Council (431 elected members, 27 ex officio members). They serve for 4 years to address 
improvement projects, promote recreational projects, cultural and community activities, advise the 
government on matter that affect the well-being of residents such as the adequacy and priorities of 
government programs. Last but not least, the Judiciary ensures that Hong Kong remains within the 
common law system, therefore the department is independent from the legislative and executive 
branches. The Court of Final Appeal is the highest of the courts headed by the Chief Justice (GovHK, 
2020).   
This is significant as we compare the democratic nature of this system with the government 
operations of the PRC. Unlike Hong Kong, mainland China is governed by a small population as opposed 
to the opinions of the majority. There are no voting rights given to the public. The Communist Party 
consists of around 91.91 million members while China’s population is 1400.05 million as of 2019 (Xinhua 
News Agency, & State Council Information Office (China), 2021; IMF, & National Bureau of Statistics of 
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China, 2021). This means that less than 7% of the population controls the entire nation. The Chinese 
Communist Party consists of a pyramid structure with Xi Jinping (current chairman of the CCP) at the 
top, then followed by The Party (also known as the Politburo Standing Committee), which consists of six 
standing committee members and eighteen members with high government roles/ titles, and finally the 
National People’s Congress at around 3000 members who write laws and supervise the government and 
the people (SCMP, 2021). This means that around 0.0000022% (3025 communist members with 
authority divided by the Chinese population of 1400.05 million) of the Chinese population actually get a 
voice of how China should be governed. Not only is the majority’s opinion ignored, but that about one in 
sixteen mainlanders, hold nearly every top position in government, military, education, state-owned 
enterprises, health care, and banking (McMorrow, 2015). Undoubtedly, a glass ceiling exists and 
inequality surrounds mainland China. If Hong Kong is to lose its current democratic governing system, it 
in a way loses a sense of identity and equality.  
Research Question  
In this thesis I argue that China had minimal intentions of allowing Hong Kong to remain 
autonomous and democratic following the 1997 handover from British rule. As mainland China has 
ramped up its economic capacity and become a major international economic player, Hong Kong’s 
ability to bargain to retain its special status has further diminished. Therefore, Hong Kong’s recent 
protests have had, and will continue to have minimal impact on the PRC’s plans to incorporate Hong 
Kong into the PRC. The current power dynamic between Hong Kong and mainland China is too 
imbalanced, in which China has much more power over Hong Kong now than the 1990s. The island had 
also waited too long to involve foreign powers for meaningful change towards their governing system. I 
argue that the ongoing Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement (also known as the 2019 
Protest) could have been anticipated based on past scholarly works. In addition, the ultimate outcome 
of this and future protest movements can also be predicted/ they will not succeed. The historical shift in 
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the power dynamics between the mainland and Hong Kong is irreversible, in other words, Hong Kong 
will continue to have more freedoms taken away, and those freedoms already taken would not be 
returned. The main body of this thesis focuses on using Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement (2014) and 
the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement (2019-2021) as evidence of Hong Kong’s decreasing 
freedoms and its decreasing economic importance to China.  
Methods  
Through this thesis I will analyze the power dynamic between Hong Kong and Mainland China 
through the lens of past scholarly works. I use scholarly books and articles published from the 1990s to 
present, however most of the utilized materials would be from sources of the 2000s. In addition to 
scholarly articles, I have included news articles, news reports (media platforms), and public government 
archives to analyze the power dynamic of Hong Kong with China. I use a variety of news media from 
different countries and a variety of scholarly works from different publishers to provide a check against 
possible confirmation bias in my selection of source. As the Hong Kong protests for democracy 
continues, events may unfold differently, yet as of the completion of this thesis the articles used will be 
based off the most recently published information. The Umbrella Movement and the ongoing Anti-
Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement will not be the last protests in Hong Kong. Given the history 
of intense protest since 1997, culminating in the current Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill 
Movement, it is likely that the fight for Hong Kong’s democracy will carry on for years to come. In the 
following section of this paper the Umbrella Movement and the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill 
Movement (also known as the 2019 Protest) is discussed in detail. Additionally, the historical events 
analyzed in this thesis will continue to have a profound impact on both the focus and the potential 
success or failure of future demonstrations.  
Literature Review  
The diminishing power and democracy of Hong Kong  Kuang 10 
First, many scholarly works discuss Taiwan’s success under the “one country, two systems” 
policy, so it is important to acknowledge the ‘Taiwan situation’ here and how it has shaped scholarly and 
popular understandings of the PRC’s relationship with Hong Kong. However, after careful consideration I 
argue that Taiwan is not a particularly useful comparative example in understanding the state of 
democracy struggles in Hong Kong today. Both Taiwan and Hong Kong have gone through democratic 
protests with police fighting against protesters and both islands were annexed to foreign nations after a 
war. However, clear differences can be seen between the two annexed islands. In 1895, China cedes 
Taiwan, among other territories to Japan after losing the First Sino-Japanese War (BBC News, 2019). The 
Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) government (with is opposing party to the CCP describe previously) 
renounces all treaties with Japan and demands the Taiwan be returned. As a post-war settlement, in 
1943, the agreement of Taiwan’s return was endorsed by the Allies in the Cairo Declaration. Finally, by 
1945, the Allies place Taiwan under Chinese administrative control. When Mao Zedong led the 
Communist (CCP) to victory over the Kuomintang (KMT) in the Chinese Revolution of 1949, the 
Kuomintang government along with roughly two million refugees evacuated to Taiwan (BBC News, 
2019). Following the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty signed by Japan and 48 Allied nations, the 
Japanese renounced all right, title, and claim to Taiwan, Penghu, the Spratly Islands, and the Paracel 
Islands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Taiwan, 2021). While the PRC has continued to claim Taiwan as part 
of the PRC, they have not had actual control over the island politically since 1949, when the Kuomintang 
(KMT) took over Taiwan. Hence, Taiwan and Hong Kong’s political situation is completely different. 
While Hong Kong is a British colony that was ‘given back’ to the CCP, Taiwan theoretically already 
belongs to the CCP but in practice is not governed in anyway by the CCP. Furthermore, Taiwan’s 
currently has two main political parties, which is the KMT and the Democratic Progressive Party that was 
formed in 1986 because of the Kaohsiung Incident. In the following year, 1987, the Martial Law that 
went into effect since 1949, ended (which allowed family visits to mainland) and bans on the formation 
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of the new political parties and news publications are lifted. Following the rise of democracy in Taiwan, 
the Republic of China Taiwan (ROC) held its first-ever direct presidential election (occurs every four 
years), in which the KMT’s Lee Teng-hui and his running mate, Lien Chan, won with a majority at 54% 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs Taiwan, 2021). It wasn’t until March 2000 that Chen Shui-bian, a Democratic 
Progressive Party candidate, won the presidential election. This ended the Kuomintang party’s fifty-year 
monopoly of power. Since then the party ruling of Taiwan has been on and off between the Democratic 
Progressive Party and the Kuomintang (KMT) (BBC News, 2019).  
In addition, it was under the KMT rule that Taiwan thrived economically. The creation of export 
processing zones, which started in 1966, allowed Taiwan to become a developed nation and set a 
paradigm for other countries to follow, with the first export processing zone in Kaohsiung city, southern 
Taiwan. Hong Kong thrived economically under the British rule as a colony port city rather than that of a 
specific zone. As Gilles Guiheux (Professor at the University of Paris) states, “Taiwan’s ‘economic 
miracle’ has long been credited to the Guomindang [Kuomintang] state and to the strategies of foreign 
multinational corporations looking into the 1960s for cheap labor… What is considered the real miracle… 
is how industrial production spread as far as almost every village of the country in a relatively short 
time” (Mengin and Rocca, 2002, p.187). It is under the Kuomintang (KMT)—not the CCP—rule that 
Taiwan prospered to its current economic ability. In 1997, Taiwan represented 33.10 percent of total 
sales on the national market of China. Professor Ran Wei from the School of Journalism and 
Communication in Hong Kong explains, “The [Taiwan] government attempted to balance considerations 
of political democratization (thus indigenization) with those of accommodation with mainland China… In 
[1993], the government further declared an end to the state of war with the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC)” (Li, 2000, p.340). Taiwan did not choose to continue to challenge Beijing’s power and kept its 
independence to a certain extent. The CCP tried to threaten and disrupt the 1996 elections with missile 
tests. For example, in May 2000, Taiwan president, Chen Shui-bian said in his inaugural speech that he 
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will not declare independence as long as mainland China does not attack, nor will he call for a 
referendum on independence or abolish Taipei’s (Taiwan’s capital city) official blueprint for an eventual 
reunion with mainland China (BBC News, 2019). Therefore, unlike Taiwan, Hong Kong is vastly different 
in terms of political power and economic rise. The British ruled over Hong Kong for over a century. It is 
during this British colonization period that Hong Kong thrived economically, which gave it the world 
financial hub title. Therefore, Taiwan cannot be compared equally with Hong Kong in terms of their road 
to democracy nor their economic build.  
Hong Kong University Professor Ming Sing’s comparative analysis on Hong Kong’s 
democratization suggests that through the period of 1980 to 2002, “the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
was the major force opposing Hong Kong’s democratization… The CCP wanted economic liberalization 
without political liberalization in order to ‘modernize’ China and, at the same time, maintain its 
hegemony” (Sing, 2002, p.204). Hong Kong’s rapid democratization would eventually become a sub-
polity of China and soon enough the CCP’s interest would be threatened. For this reason, the CCP took 
many counter measures toward limiting the power of Hong Kong while taking control of the Hong Kong 
governing system from within. Professor of Hong Kong Studies at The University of Hong Kong, Yiu-wai 
Chu argues that “Hong Kong has been trouble by the anxiety of becoming another Mainland city [thus 
Hong Kong] took great pains branding itself into an ‘international’ city, which, … led to its being lost in 
transition” (Chu, 2013, p.151). For a city as well defined in the global context to be ‘lost in transition’ is a 
major global issue. Phillip Bowring, columnist for the International Herald Tribune and consultant to 
Kleinwort Benson Securities Asia, notes that Hong Kong faces multiple challenges, but its biggest 
challenge is to perhaps “retain its own openness and accessibility.” Hong Kong had been advantageous 
over Singapore due to “the freedom of the press and lack of politically driven constraints on social 
behavior” (Cohan and Zhao, 1997, p.23). If Hong Kong loses its democratic system, then the island’s very 
identity would be taken away along with any advantages that come with it such as the attraction of 
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foreign investors and foreign employment. Other scholarly works have analyzed the necessity of Hong 
Kong to keep its political independence, yet the island would face many challenges.  
These challenges were already stated by even earlier published works such as Norman Miners’s 
The government and politics of Hong Kong (1986), Frank Ching’s Hong Kong and China: “one country, 
two systems”? (1996), and John Young’s Precarious balance: Hong Kong between China and Britain 
(1994). These scholars warned Hong Kong of potential disputes as China rushed the process of Hong 
Kong’s political transition. In 1998, Willem Van Kemenade, a journalist and correspondent for the major 
Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad published his book, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Inc., which also 
analyzed the anatomy and integration of China’s “three systems,” or simply put Mainland China, Hong 
Kong, and Taiwan. By opening old ‘treaty ports’ China hopes to accelerate its economic construction. 
Kemenade explains, “The creation of these zones was inspired partly by the pre-Communist experience 
of the old treaty ports, partly by the more recent worldwide experience of developing market 
economies, most of all Taiwan” (Kmemenade, 1998, p.161). While Taiwan in the 1960s had established 
three export processing zones and emerged as a major trading power by the early 1980s, China had yet 
to start its global trade. The treaty ports became Special Economic Zones (SEZs). According to 
Kmemenade, “To further China’s dual goals of reintegration with Taiwan and Hong Kong and 
acceleration of outward economic development, four special economic zones (SEZs) were established in 
the southeastern coastal belt near Hong Kong and Taiwan” (Kmemenade, 1998, p.161). These zones 
became relatively successful, and today include Shengzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen. Chinese 
Special Economic Zones vary in scope and function but made significant contributions to China’s 
economic progress (World Bank, 2019). According to the China Development Bank, the different types 
of Chinese SEZs are administrative areas, geographical areas, international cooperation, local industrial 
parks, industry clusters, and corporate SEZs (World Bank, 2017). Hong Kong went from being a British 
colony to a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) of China, and now, at the start of the third decade of the 
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twenty-first century, it is just one of many such SEZs. As China positions itself as a world power, it is 
increasingly confident in claiming and displaying that power, especially now that Hong Kong has lost its 
initial outsized important in growing the overall Chinese economy. As a consequence, the CCP has a 
strong interest in limiting Hong Kong’s power even more as Hong Kong is no longer a key component to 
China’s overall economic status.  
More recent scholarly works have focused on Hong Kong’s protests after 2000. On the first of 
July 2003, more than half a million people took to the streets to protest Beijing’s new national security 
reform, as known as Article 23. Article 23 of the Basic Law states: 
The Hong Kong Special Administration Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of 
treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s Government, or theft of 
state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organization or bodies from conducting political 
activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from 
establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies (Cheng, 2005, p.1).  
Anthony B. L. Cheung, professor at the City University of Hong Kong, explains that Hong Kong is in great 
political turmoil, “Article 23 came not just an issue about whether laws should be enacted to protect 
national sovereignty and security, but rather a perceived threat to political freedoms and civil rights 
presently enjoyed by Hong Kong people who regard them as part and parcel of the ‘one country, two 
systems’ deal” (Cheng, 2005, p.33). According to Professor Joseph Y.S. Cheung at the City University of 
Hong Kong, the 1st of July 2003 Rally is different from the three major protest rallies in May-June 1989 
during the Tiananmen Incident: first, Hong Kong people marched for a Hong Kong issue; second, with 
the Article 23 legislation and the issue of democratization, the pro-Beijing United Front had been fully 
mobilized in support of the Tung Administration (Cheng, 2005, p.2). Hong Kong was and still is on the 
verge of searching for a new Hong Kong identity. Mainland China and Hong Kong are on opposite ends 
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of the grid of civilization, in other words, what is good and essential for Hong Kong’s new generation is 
essentially lethal to Beijing’s core values. Ching-tin Hung, Professor at the University of Hong Kong, 
notes the divide between the motherland and the island: 
Both [mainland] officials and intellectuals shared the same despise and detest for Hong Kong’s 
colonial status that was extended nearly 50 years after 1949. Above all, they see Hong Kong’s 
freedom and individualism, equality and openness, pluralism and interactivity, rule of system 
and rule of law philosophically, an anathema to the Chinese ontology, and politically a 
continuation of the imperialist and colonialist to sabotage China after 1997 (Cheng, 2005, 
p.131).  
This divide between the motherland and island had only gotten worse over time as Hong Kong’s younger 
generations (the Millennials generation and forward) grew up with liberal values and expectation, in an 
international city outside of China’s Great Firewall. Hence, most protests if not all recent protests are 
mostly composed of the members of the younger generations.  
 In 2014 the Umbrella Movement became Hong Kong’s next most spectacular struggle for 
democracy. In this 79 day movement the protest marked “a significant episode for both new global 
activism and Hong Kong’s political history” (Ma and Cheng, 2019, p.12). Ngok Ma (Associate Professor at 
the Chinese University of Hong Kong) and Edmund W. Cheng’s (Associate Professor at the City University 
of Hong Kong) book, The Umbrella Movement: Civil Resistance and Contentious Space in Hong Kong, 
goes beyond the traditions of social movement studies and instead pay attention to the role of emotion 
and new agency in the protests. Ngok Ma states, “Years of conventional protests and bargaining had 
failed to bring about full democracy for Hong Kong. The rise of a new political identity and trends of 
radicalization in social and political movements [fueled] the massive civil disobedience campaign” (Ma 
and Cheng, 2019, p.27). The movement prompted the rise of a new political identity among the younger 
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generation of Hong Kong. This trend towards radicalization in local movements is pushed by the younger 
generation’s determination to have more say in their political future. Samson Yuen, Assistant Professor 
of Political Science at Lingnan University, demonstrates how “the city’s hybrid regime adaptively 
switched its response from repression to attrition, after police repression catalyzed heightened 
mobilization” (Ma and Cheng, 2019, p.185). Yuen explains that this strategy of attrition entailed an array 
of defensive and offensive tactics that extended beyond ignoring protests. “The regime actively sought 
to maintain elite cohesion and block political opportunities while leveraging counter-movements and 
legal interventions to increase the participation cost of the protests and mobilize public discontent,” 
says Yuen. For this reason, even with resistance from protesters ultimately the attribution strategy 
suggests an effective regime response and a flexible holder of tactics. The pro-regime mobilization of 
Hong Kong shows in 2011, there were 5 parades, in 2012 there were 4 demonstrations and parades, in 
2013, there were 4 parades, 27 demonstrations, and 4 signature campaigns. In 2014, when the Umbrella 
Movement went into motion, there were 8 parades, 27 demonstrations, and 9 signature campaigns (Ma 
and Cheng, 2019, p.196). Chair Professor Yongshun Cai of social science at the Hong Kong University of 
Science and Technology, suggests that for protesting groups to achieve their desired effect they must 
need to carry out tactical escalation in order to empower their action. Cai explains that the public 
support is not the only thing that is considered in an effective tactical escalation (in terms of 
empowering their action), but that timing of the escalation reveals the essence of a movement’s 
momentum. Therefore, Cai argues, “the tactical escalation of the Umbrella Movement proved to be 
ineffective because some tactics damaged the movement’s image or were undertaken at a time when 
the momentum was already significantly low” (Ma and Cheng, 2019, p.209). Yongshun Cai showed how 
newspaper coverage of the Umbrella Movement from Apple Daily and Mingpao (News) went from over 
120 articles in September 2014 to just below 20 articles in November 2014 (Ma and Cheng, 2019. p.220). 
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Indeed, both the 1st of July 2003 Protest Rally and the Umbrella Movement deem to be unsuccessful for 
Hong Kong’s democratic movement against the CCP.  
Regardless of the Umbrella Movement’s success or lack thereof, many symbols and art forms 
used to symbolize the protests are still relevant in Hong Kong’s fight for democracy including the iconic 
yellow umbrella that was used by protesters to repel police tear gas. Associate Professor Tai Wei Lim at 
the National University of Singapore analyzed the use of symbols, art, and aesthetics in the first phase of 
Hong Kong’s ‘Occupy Central’ movement (the Umbrella Movement). Lim found that: 
There is a limit to cultural soft power influence in effecting immediate change. If conflated with 
bread-and-butter issues, it can be a spark or accelerator of mass-based discontent. But if 
confined to a particular demographic and occupational group like the students in this first phase 
of the Revolution, transformative changes are unlikely… While transformative changes are 
unlikely, and foreign pressure is present but measure, the impact of the first phase of the 
Umbrella Revolution is mainly symbolic, cultural, and soft power persuasion (Lim, 2015, p.97).  
The Umbrella Movement remains an iconic movement with much violence from the Central 
Government, however, the mark the revolution left behind can be said to be “an exercise in creating 
awareness, a generational… assertion of wants and desires and a long-term devotion to Hong Kong” 
(Lim, 2015, p.97).  
Through these two major protest experiences the mainland Chinese authorities certainly know 
what Hong Kong is capable of during democratic demonstrations, but they are increasingly savvy about 
the kind of tactics necessary to efficiently degrade the movement’s momentum for future political 
movements. In 1997, Michael Elliott and Dorinda Elliot journalists for Newsweek LLC notes, “the return 
of Hong Kong to China after 156 years of British rule symbolizes the decline of one economy and rise of 
another” (Elliot and Elliot, 1997). In their article, Why the world watches: how China treats Hong Kong 
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will reveal its true face, they quote Michel Oksenberg, senior fellow at the Asia-Pacific Research Center 
at Stanford University in 1997, who argues, “Hong Kong is clearly a litmus test of China’s capacity to 
adhere to international agreement… It will indicate what sort of power China is going to be” (Elliot and 
Elliot, 1997). The interest of Hong Kong’s political movements are not just a matter of commercial 
interests or human rights. Ming Sing, Associate Professor at the City University of Hong Kong, suggests 
that Beijing will continue to face challenges to address the younger generation’s aspirations of 
democracy and greater propensity to join civil disobedience movements (Ma and Cheng, 2019, p.233). 
2019 marked the start of the most recent and controversial democracy protest in Hong Kong’s 
post—1997 history. Hong Kong’s Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement continues to go on at 
the time of writing. As of now, not many scholarly works have been found published on this movement, 
although news articles, magazine coverage, and other forms of media such as videos have been tracking 
the movement since it started in March of 2019. As the movement’s name implies, the protest started 
with China’s implementation of the Extradition Law. According to a New York Times article: 
The bill would allow Hong Kong to detain and transfer people wanted in countries and 
territories with which it has no formal extradition agreements, including Taiwan and the Chinese 
mainland… Critics contend that the law would allow virtually anyone in the city to be picked up 
and detained in mainland China, a country in which judges must follow the orders of the 
Community Party (Ives, 2019).  
In response to what was seen as a clear overreach of power by the mainland government, hundreds of 
thousands of people in Hong Kong demonstrated against the proposed law. The fear was, and remains, 
that the law would allow extraditions to mainland China not only of criminals, but also of political 
activists. This also includes journalists under the assumption that they partake in any action to harm the 
national security of China, which violates the free press policy of Hong Kong’s core value. Although Hong 
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Kong’s Basic Law is due to expire in 2047, Hong Kong’s guaranteed autonomy has weakened drastically 
as a consequence of the Chinese governments actions, of which the extradition law is only the most 
recent—and egregious—example. Mike Ives, New York Times journalist, wrote, “[Mainland China’s] 
security apparatus increasingly [encroaches] on Hong Kong—for example, by abducting bookseller and a 
Chinese-born billionaire” (Ives, 2019). The power dynamic between mainland China and Hong Kong 
continues to evolve and part of Hong Kong’s autonomous identity is lost by each year if not by each day.  
Research Analysis 
As mentioned above, during the turnover of Hong Kong in 1997, the island was guaranteed a 50-
year adaptation period in which established basic democratic freedoms are to be honored by the 
Chinese state. While China promised to follow through with the time frame set by the turnover treaty, 
China really did not have the intention to honor this agreement in full. Many warnings of this are found 
in past scholarly work and in light of recent events they prove to be quite relevant. In this section, the 
introduction of new laws, and other forms of state power imposed onto Hong Kong by China, are 
analyzed more in depth.  
In the case of the Umbrella Movement, on 31 August 2014, the National People’s Congress 
(NPCSC), a high-leveled governing branch of the CCP, announced that a pseudo-democratic model 
resembling that of Iran would be introduced for the 2017 Chief Executive election (Ma and Cheng, 2019, 
p.234). Under Annex I of the Basic Law implies that as early as 2007 Hong Kong could elect the Chief 
Executive by universal suffrage, yet in 2004, the NPCSC’s reinterpretation of the Basic Law denied that 
privilege. By 2007, the NPCSC consented that the Chief Executive can be elected via universal suffrage in 
2017. Ming Sing’s comparative politics research explains: 
From a mass values approach, support for democracy and trust that the Chinese government in 
upholding its promises are found to be statistically significant in explaining the massive support 
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for the Umbrella Movement. From a performance perspective, the perceived performance of 
the HKSAR government in handling China-Hong Kong tensions, the perceived economic 
performance and upward social mobility of Hong Kong, have also shaped the support for the 
movement (Ma and Cheng, 2019, p.233). 
It is because of the lack of trust on the part of Hong Kong’s population that the Chinese government to 
uphold their promise that massive support emerged for the Umbrella Movement, and this ongoing lack 
of trust has also led to the emergence of the 2019 protests. The 2019 protests started in May and 
become violent on October 1st, when the police started using tear gas on protestors. In December 2019, 
a survey conducted by the Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute showed that 59% of city 
residents was in support of the protest while 30% opposed the protest (Promfret and Jim, 2019). 
Furthermore, the study indicated that only 17% expressed support toward seeking independence from 
China, which means most protestors only want China to return these freedoms, and not necessarily to 
break away from the Chinese system completely. However, the CCP saw this as a strong threat to their 
power (BBC News, 2020). By July, the CCP introduced a new national security law to counteract the 
leading activists of the protest. This national security law criminalizes any act of secession (breaking 
away from the country), subversion (undermining the power or authority of the central government), 
terrorism (using violence or intimidation against people), and collusion with foreign or external forces 
(including Britain and the US) (Tsoi and Wai, 2020).  
Hong Kongers saw this new national security law as just as much of a threat as the Extradition 
Law, if not more. Then the CCP showed immense political presence in Hong Kong on July 8th, 2020, when 
they opened their new national security office in Hong Kong by renovating in a hotel near in the city 
center (one of the most popular venues for pro-democracy protests). This new headquarters’ task is to 
oversee the Hong Kong government’s enforcement of the national security legislation that Beijing 
imposed on the city. The office holds immense power that extends far beyond what the local Hong Kong 
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police force could do, including but not limited to: taking enforcement action beyond existing city laws, 
allow their agents to take suspects across the border for trials in the CCP controlled courts, and block 
the Hong Kong authorities to inspect their vehicles (Chow and Kwok, 2020). The CCP claim that purpose 
of the office is to serve as a gatekeeper for national security, but an important question is why the CCP 
office opened as soon as the protests started. With an office that holds more power than the local Hong 
Kong police, the CCP can execute their plans without delays and most importantly to be able to act as an 
independent institution from the Hong Kong government system.   
Even with these constraints, the recent and still ongoing 2019 protests have been more 
significant than previous protests in a few regards: first, the extent of violence shown by the police; 
second, the extreme laws enacted to limit social gathering in efforts to stop activists from forming 
protests; third, the extreme measures taken by the CCP to stop all forms of encouragement for activist 
activities. An obvious but important physical display of power is the thousands of police officers 
patrolling the streets of Hong Kong at any hour of the day. Nearly all of the Hong Kong officers are sent 
to the streets and are given the power to stop protestors at all means including the use of tear gas, 
water cannon, guns loaded with rubber bullets, and armed trucks. In the first month of the protests the 
police arrested at least 180 people with several of them hospitalized (Wang et al., 2020). In groups of 
ten or more the police officers had an overpowering stance over mostly unarmed protestors. The police 
claimed that they had deployed tear gas to disperse protestors who blocked traffic and threw umbrellas, 
water bottles and other objects at officers. However, according to many videos on social media the 
police officers chased down many protestors and fired pepper balls or tear gas at close range. This may 
be more violence than necessary to simply clear the streets of protestors, it is a reminder for Hong 
Kongers that the government’s decisions are final. On the other hand, some protestors acted more 
violently than before after the government showed no mercy. A Hong Kong theater artist, Michelle 
Chung said, “I wouldn’t use optimistic but I would say that if we do not insist, we will not see hope. It’s 
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because we insist, that hope will remain out there” (Wang et al., 2020). Hope is indeed important in any 
protest, but Beijing intends to diminish any hope. For example, police offices are allowed to use force to 
break up any gathering on the street, search anyone they see on the street without reason, and arrest 
anyone who seems to be pro-democracy including holding up banners, signs, umbrellas, or wearing any 
logos that is associated with the protest. These government actions spread a sense of fear to anyone 
who supports the protest and as a result a non-visual grip is taken place over each Hong Konger’s 
behavior toward the protest.  
Furthermore, hope is created through encouragement of fellow peers and other forms of 
support, but this hope can easily be shatter if the support foundation is destroyed. This is precisely what 
the CCP hope to do. In 2007, Dutch artist Florentijn Hofman set afloat a massive, 12-metre rubber duck 
in Victoria Harbour as part of a planned world tour. By 2013, the yellow rubber duck arrived in Hong 
Kong’s harbor. This symbol quickly became Hong Kong’s business and spirit of ‘can do’ (Sito, 2018). 
Yellow duck merchant stores started to pop-up as it became more popular. In 2019 the duck became a 
symbol for the 2019 Protest as the yellow umbrella had been for the Umbrella Movement. Journalist 
Leonid Bershidsky noted that the yellow rubber duck is a potent protest symbol that had been used all 
over the world for diverse reasons such as the 2016 government corruption protest in Brazil (2017). 
More recently in 2020, Thailand protestors used rubber yellow ducks as a symbol of the anti-
government protest. Beijing have recognized the effects of a symbolic figure to protestors, hence 
making it a priority to stop the spread of this yellow duck as efficiently as possible. Herbert Chow, owner 
of clothing brand Chickeeduck, had been struggling to get his designs made in mainland China since the 
protest started and his duck print products were seized by mainland authorities for ‘advocating violence’ 
(SCMP, 2021). For example, Chow’s design on a bag shows on one side five yellow ducks swimming and 
on the other a duck holds a flag while standing on a rock. The CCP says this design represents ‘five 
demands, not one less,’ which was a slogan used in the 2019 Hong Kong anti-government protest. The 
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five demands being: full withdrawal of the extradition bill, a commission of inquiry into alleged police 
brutality, retracting the classification of protesters as “rioters,” amnesty for arrested protesters, and 
lastly, dual universal suffrage for both the Legislative Council and the Chief Executive (Tsui-kai, 2019). By 
removing the yellow duck designs from the clothing market Beijing can manage the spread of word for 
the protest as well as convey the message that Hong Kong’s business and spirit of ‘can do’ is something 
the CCP can easily be taken away, or in other words Hong Kong should keep to their boundaries.  
Any kind of support shown toward the protest would be an obstacle to Beijing’s plan. This even 
includes Apply Daily, one of the most popular and biggest pro-democracy newspaper in Hong Kong 
(Marsh, 2021). It took only a year for the new National Security Law to end Apply Daily’s free press 
journey that started in 1995. Chief Executive of Hong Kong, Carrie Lam, promised in 2019 when the 
National Security Law was introduced that press freedoms would be protected, but it seems that 
promise did not last. Apple Daily’s founder, Jimmy Lai, was jailed for attending a pro-democracy rally 
and charged with colluding with foreign forces to endanger national security. Since Lai’s arrest in 
December of 2020, four more top editors of the newspaper and executives had been charged the same 
crime, which was using articles to voice for foreign governments to sanction Hong Kong. Since these 
arrests hundreds of police officers raided the publication office twice while seizing computers and 
materials. Some journalists chose to quit their positions as their work had become too dangerous to 
continue. To completely dismantle the daily functions of Apply Daily, Hong Kong authorities had frozen 
all of the company’s bank accounts which forced the company to announce its final end. This is 
important to note because in the Umbrella Movement of 2014 Lai’s Apple Daily became a symbol of the 
opposition to the CCP’s plan of how Hong Kong’s leader would be selected (Marsh, 2021). During the 
2019 Protest, Apple Daily’s front page often urged readers to attend planned protests. The company 
even printed anti-government posters for these protests to carry on the streets. It seems that the CCP 
grew impatient with political positions that diverge from those of their own. The freedoms of Hong Kong 
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are quickly diminishing as the protest in Hong Kong continues. It is precisely through fear of getting in 
trouble with the authorities that the CCP is able to greatly diminish any hope that remains in the 
possibility of pro-democracy legislation. Even with the support of the public in the selling out 500,000 
newspaper copies, Apple Daily can not win a war against an all controlling government. This is a massive 
indicator of how shallow Hong Kong’s basic freedoms had gotten since its return to China. While Carrie 
Lam tried to dismiss the fear of losing these basic freedoms by suggesting that these police probe into 
Apply Daily were “unrelated to normal journalist work” (Marsh, 2021). However, there is no denying the 
fact that forcing a pro-democracy newspaper to close and threating journalists with time in jail is part of 
a governing process to create fear and minimize the freedom of press.  The Basic Law which guaranteed 
freedom of expression and the media seems to be ineffectual against the new national security law that 
had set increasingly narrow parameters for journalists to work with. President of NGO Freedom House, 
Michael J. Abramowitz, said, “Treating independent, fact-based journalism as a threat to national 
security is an unacceptable attack on press freedom and comes amid a wider crack down of freedom of 
expression and freedom of assembly in Hong Kong” (Marsh, 2021). This is a sign from the CCP that 
anyone who has the desire to support present or future protests will be accounted to go against the 
new National Security Law or in other words against the CCP.  
Through this analysis of Beijing’s increasing amendments to Hong Kong’s laws it can be 
concluded that Beijing had little intention of allowing Hong Kong to stay democratic regardless of the 
treaty signed with Britain. As Lee Jonghyuk, an assistant professor at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological 
University said, “There will be no reversion [for Hong Kong]. This is quite certain. Universal suffrage is a 
mere obstacle to the stability of the Community Party’s regime” (Illmer, 2021). The new power dynamic 
status is much leaned toward the advantage of the Communist Party without doubt, yet Beijing intends 
to not only ‘trample’ on Hong Kong (as many journalists describe the situation), but to make its political 
presence more known in Hong Kong than ever before.  
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Hong Kong’s social impact  
While the streets of Hong Kong seem to be back to normal in 2021, the protest is far from being 
over.  The streets still have graffiti that are uncovered and some buildings are still under renovation. 
More importantly, the economic and social impacts of the protests are visible everywhere in Hong Kong. 
The island has reached the widest political divide in its history. For example, never have local businesses 
in the global financial hub been so politically divided. Mobile phone application platforms have popped 
up showing maps of businesses that are believed to be supporting the protests as well as those that are 
not. Restaurants that support the Hong Kong movement have yellow stickers on their doors while those 
supporting the Chinese government have blue stickers. Scanning the stickers QR code shows a Google 
Maps page revealing assumed yellow and blue around the city (CNBC, 2020). Activists also classify an 
area that is marked black on media platforms as ‘thrashing’ (to destroy the entirety of the property) 
while red indicates spray-painting the area (Wai, 2019). Although these more extreme actions are no 
longer as common on the streets of Hong Kong, this social divide forces Hong Kongers to choose a side 
in the ongoing political dispute over the future of the island. For example, some customers choose to 
support specific restaurants over others because they want to support the protestors (CNBC, 2020). 
Some Hong Kongers feel that a pro-democracy restaurant gives them a safe environment to express 
themselves as well as gather with like-minded people. An undeniable fact is that Hong Kong is becoming 
more divided as the protests go on. It is unknown how long this kind of business model will last in the 
city, but it may lead to greater economic problems later. For example, businesses can be threatened to 
close down by the government, vandalized by the public, or even boycotted due to these political 
differences. In early October of 2019, Starbucks stores in Hong Kong were vandalized and boycotted by 
protestors. While Starbucks is a U.S. brand, the local company, Maxim’s Caterers, operate the franchise. 
Annie Wu, daughter of the Maxim Group’s founder, had defended the Hong Kong police and criticized 
the activists as ‘radical protesters’ (Wai, 2019). Her statements were enough for Hong Kongers to 
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boycott Starbucks completely. Maxim’s Caterers had a spokesperson explain that Annie Wu’s words 
does not reflect the company as she is not associated with the company, however the damage has been 
done and many customers have not returned. More recently a Hong Kong drinks company, Vitasoy, has 
been boycotted by China’s Mainlanders. Vitasoy expressed condolences to the family of a deceased 
employee who died after stabbing a Hong Kong police officer before turning the knife on himself (Hui, 
2021). On social media, Hong Kongers praised Vitasoy for its condolence, however, Mainlanders saw it 
as an expression of supporting the assailant. As 71% of Vitasoy’s revenue in 2020 comes from mainland 
China, the company quickly posted on social media the next day saying Vitasoy supports the Hong Kong 
national security police’s investigation on the attack and that they retain the right to take legal action 
against the employee who sent the unauthorized “extremely inappropriate” memo on social media. 
Some Chinese actors such as Gong Jun and Ren Jialun announced that they would cease to cooperate 
with Vitasoy in the future. This led Vitasoy’s stock exchange in Hong Kong to fall over 10% on July 5, 
2021. These kinds of boycotts seem to become more and more common in Hong Kong. This protest is 
changing the financial hub for the worse because more businesses will be targeted in the future. It 
seems that no matter which side a business chooses to support the public’s reaction is negative. This 
negativity can destroy a well-established business regardless of the brand’s origin or its business 
category.  
Disney’s live-action remake of Mulan released in Hong Kong in September, but the film faced 
many criticisms in Hong Kong. First, Yifei Liu who played as Mulan in the film reshared a post from 
People’s Daily, a state-backed newspaper. The reshared post read: “I support the Hong Kong police. You 
can all attack me now”, which is a rallying cry for the Chinese government and its supporters Liu shared 
the above post on Weibo, a Chinese social media platform, and added in Chinese, “I also support the 
Hong Kong police” (Chow, 2020).  This generated 81,000 likes but it also received backlash from those 
who supported the protest. For example, Joshua Wong, a well-respected activist leader in the 2019 
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Protest, posted on Twitter saying, “This film is released today. But because Disney kowtows to Beijing, 
and because Liu Yifei openly and proudly endorses police brutality in Hong Kong, I urge everyone who 
believe in human right to #BoycottMulan” (Chow, 2020). Supporters of the protest intensified their 
criticism even more after seeing the film’s credits giving thanks to several government entities in 
Xinjaing including the Turpan Municipal Bureau of Public Security. In November 2019, leaked documents 
of the CCP revealed that the Turpan Municipal Bureau of Public Security had at least one million 
Muslims have been detained at detention camps for Muslim Uighurs and other ethnic minorities. The 
prisoners were subjected to physical control and mental intimidation, which human rights advocates 
claim is an abuse to human rights (Campbell, 2010). While Disney’s representative and Liu’s publicist did 
not immediately respond to requests for comment, it is important note how sensitive the 2019 Protest 
has become since its start. Both the supporters of the protest and the supporters of the government are 
willing to go to extreme lengths to find fault in the other. The political divide in Hong Kong’s society 
becomes stronger and more visible as the protest drags on.  
 Even well-established Hong Kong celebrities, like global martial arts star Jackie Chan, have been 
criticized by netizens. In August 2019, Chan reshared a post on Weibo, a Chinese social media platform, 
by the mainland state media, CCTV, and the posted content is a Chinese national flag with the hashtag 
of “Five starred red flag has 1.4 billion flag guards” (Atkin, 2019). Although Chan is not the only celebrity 
of Hong Kong to support Beijing, he was among the first to criticize the protest openly. Chan even tells 
the Chinese state media in an interview after the reshared post incident that, “Safety, stability, and 
peace are just like fresh air, you never know how precious it is until you lose it” (Atkin, 2019). Hong 
Kongers were outraged by these comments and marked him as a traitor of Hong Kong. Some pro-
democracy activists even suggest Hong Kong people should boycott all his artist creations all together, 
including his albums and movies. It is uncertain if Jackie Chan’s reputation will revive in Hong Kong but 
his career has certainly been impacted. Another well-known Cantonese celebrity is Liza Wang, who 
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actually left Shanghai as a young woman to seek out an acting career in Hong Kong. In an interview by 
South China Morning Post, Wang admitted that she first became a member of the National People’s 
Congress in 1988 and to this day it’s been thirty years. She was part of the National People’s Congress 
for ten years and twenty years as part of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Wang 
says she goes back to the mainland on occasion to perform, but anything outside of Hong Kong is 
considered a bonus market. She states: 
I feel we can’t keep thinking we are still as we were decades or say twenty years ago. You need 
to really understand that the speed of mainland China’s rise is very fast. If you just sit and wait, 
then what are you waiting for? And when it comes to those who are not willing to take a look at 
the mainland, which is a huge amount of Hong Kong people… One needs to learn from others in 
order to strengthen oneself and connect with the world… I feel the most important thing to 
admit is that you are Chinese. You don’t need to emphasize it all the time. I don’t know why it 
seems like you have to choose to be either a Chinese or a Hong Konger. I think we are all 
Chinese people. First, you need to say who you are then you can accept everything about the 
mainland. We’re actually part of it, right? (SCMP, 2018).  
Both interviews show that older celebrities of Hong Kong believe Hong Kongers are indeed Chinese. 
According to a survey by the Chinese University of Hong Kong the demographics of the protesters are as 
follows: 19 years or younger is 11.5%, 20-29 years old is 46.3%, 30-39 years old is 18.2%, 40-49 years old 
is 8.9%, and 50 years and older is 14.2%. The protesters education level is 75.2% with college education, 
23.5% with secondary education, and only 1.1% with primary education (Buchholz, 2019). This could 
mean that older generations of Hong Kongers feel more connected with their Chinese roots than that of 
being a British subject. This analysis shows that a vivid social divide between the different generations of 
Hong Kong people had been established in Hong Kong. This kind of divide can affect Kong Kong’s future 
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greatly. For example, Beijing must have a firm holding over Hong Kong’s every move before more 
kinship in Hong Kong refuse to acknowledge their Chinese identity. 
 Also worth analyzing is that the above data shows the political attitudes of Hong Kongers has 
been changing for years. Joseph Y.S. Cheng, professor of political science at the City University of Hong 
Kong, found that “While [Hong Kong people] perceived democracy as an important means to guarantee 
their freedoms, their lifestyles, and their living standards, they also consider that their own individual 
efforts are more significant – more liable to improve their lives. Such attitudes and orientations continue 
to define political participation in Hong Kong in the mid-1990s” (Cohen and Zhao, 1997, p.183). After 
every protest in Hong Kong’s history of democracy, it seems more supporters show on the streets and 
the younger the age group gets. This is a correlation worth noting because if the problem is that younger 
generations do not feel “Chinese” enough, in which they feel closer to being a British subject, then what 
Beijing may consider doing is reconnecting these younger generations to Chinese nationalism. 
Regardless of whether the CCP decide to reintroduce Chinese nationalism to Hong Kong youth or not, 
Hong Kong’s social impact from the protest will certainly last beyond the protest period.  
Unlike Liu, Chan and Wong, some entertainers did openly support Hong Kong’s protests. For 
example, Denise Ho, a Cantopop singer, voiced her support for the pro-democracy movement of 2019. 
Beijing decided to blacklist Denise Ho from the mainland Chinese market. Anthony Wong, a Hong Kong 
actor, openly supported the Umbrella Movement in 2014, but by going against the government he lost 
over half of his annual income from mainland China. Anthony Wong says in an interview with the New 
York Times, “I think they are trying to ban us because they’re afraid of different views” (Chow, 2020). It 
is a norm for Chinese entertainers to support the government or not say anything at all as to avoid 
negative career implications. This explains how the CCP utilized fear to control Hong Kong much earlier 
than the current pro-democracy protest. The longer that Hong Kong protesters continue these protests 
the harder it becomes to rally more supporters because of the legitimate fear of CCP reprisals. Hong 
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Kong is changing as the CCP continues to gain control over Hong Kong’s government, economy, and 
society, and these changes have many grave implications for the future of democracy and autonomy in 
Hong Kong. Hong Kong is known to be a global financial hub of opportunity, but the unsteady political 
conditions have changed that perception. Besides Vitasoy many businesses have fallen victim to the 
political wrath of mainlanders including the National Basketball Association (NBA), luxury brands 
Givenchy and Versace, fashion retailer H&M, and gaming company Blizzard Entertainment, while 
supporters of the protest boycotted Disney’s Mulan and Starbucks. It is certain that if this political 
dispute continues it will harm Hong Kong’s future economy as it becomes a less attractive business 
location to investors.  
Hong Kong’s stock exchange and mainland China’s special economic zones (SEZ) 
 When Hong Kong was returned to China in 1997, Philip Bowring, a columnist for the 
International Herald Tribune and consultant to Kleinwort Benson Securities Asia, warned, “Hong Kong 
faces multiple challenges. Its biggest challenge may be to retain its own openness and accessibility. For 
example, its freedom of the press and lack of politically driven constraints on social behavior have given 
it an advantage over Singapore” (Cohen and Zhao, 1997). He argues that the huge foreign portfolio 
presence in Hong Kong’s stock market is a major benefit and that the market ha grown very large 
relative to the size of the economy in which the market capitalization is around 400 billion U.S. dollars 
while the gross domestic product (GDP) is around 150 billion U.S. dollars in 1997. Frank Ching, senior 
editor for the Far Eastern Economic Review and one of the founders of The Wall Street Journal’s bureau 
in Beijing, says, “The territory also benefits from a large number of entrepreneurial businessmen who 
are constantly on the look out for new opportunities. It boasts a level playing field for business, as well 
as an efficient, honest and apolitical civil service and an independent judiciary” (Ching, 1996). If the 
foreigners who pumped up the Hong Kong economy lose faith in their market, then Hong Kong could be 
in serious economic trouble. While Hong Kong managed to handle the handover in 1997, history has 
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repeated itself in that Hong Kong faces the challenge of retaining its openness and accessibility once 
again. This time however Hong Kong shows signs of losing these freedoms, as China ascends as a world 
superpower.  
 To understand the financial establishments of Hong Kong, it is necessary to briefly review the 
history of Hong Kong’s stock exchange history. In 1891 the Association of Stockbrokers in Hong Kong 
(named The Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 1914) was form, the first formal stock exchange platform in 
Hong Kong. The second stock exchange was incorporated in 1921. By 1947 the two stock exchange 
platforms above merged to form a joint exchange under the name of “The Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
Ltd” (HKEX, 2021). Later, three more stock exchanges opened for business: The Far East Exchange Ltd 
opened in 1969, The Kam Ngan Stock Exchange Ltd opened in 1971, and The Kowloon Stock Exchange 
Ltd opened in 1972. By 1980, the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd was incorporated. Although the 
previous four stock platforms fared well for a while under new stock trading rules, they all closed 
business on March 27th, 1986 and leaving only the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd or as known as the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX). After the 1987 market crash in Hong Kong, it led to the reform of the 
Hong Kong securities industry, in which the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) was formally 
established in 1989, the same years as HKEX’s formation of the Hong Kong Securities Clearing Company 
Ltd. It wasn’t until 1999 that growth companies that do not fulfill the requirements of profitability or 
track record for the main board of exchange could list in the new open platform of the Growth 
Enterprise Market (GEM). With new regulations in place and the market infrastructure improved (i.e. 
the Central Clearing and Settlement System (CCASS) and the Automatic Order Matching and Execution 
System (AMS)), Hong Kong thrived as a global financial hub. The HKEX and GEM are the two boards of 
investment in Hong Kong that will be analyzed to assess the change of Hong Kong’s financial growth.  
 The gross domestic product (GDP) of Hong Kong from 2006 to 2019 grew approximately 91%. In 
2006 Hong Kong’s GDP was 1503.35 billion Hong Kong dollars (HKD) or 193.36 billion USD and each year 
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the GDP increased (with the exception of 2009 due to the Global Recession). The most recent data 
shows that Hong Kong's 2019 GDP was 2865.68 billion HKD or 368.68 billion USD (Textor, 2021). This 
indicates that Hong Kong’s overall economy is doing well and is still considered a notable global financial 
hub despite the protest starting in mid-2019. However, the GDP is a superficial number in that the 
economic information is too broad. The reason is that the financial services industry accounted for over 
a tenth of Hong Kong’s GDP as early as 2000 at 12.8% (Hong Kong Consensus and Statistics Department, 
2021). Since 2000, financial services had been increasing steadily and in 2019 financial services 
accounted for 21.2% of Hong Kong’s GDP (Textor, 2021). This means a fifth of Hong Kong's GDP is 
related to the stock market in one way or another. The CCP and mainland businesses knew that 
foreigners trusted Hong Kong as a global financial hub, hence it was a great way to utilize the HKEX and 
GEM to gather foreign investments. Tsingtao Brewery Co Ltd became the first mainland incorporated 
enterprise to obtain a primary listing in Hong Kong as early as 1993 (HKEX, 2021). The number of 
mainland enterprises only increased as the number of yuan-dominated investment products (yuan being 
the currency of mainland China) in Hong Kong went from 222 in 2016 to 287 in 2020 (Slotta, 2021). The 
number of listed companies in Greater China in 2020 by stock exchange is: HKEX at 2710, HK GEM at 
368, Shanghai at 1843, Shenzhen at 2390, and Taiwan at 948 (Slotta, 2021). This means HKEX is the most 
popular stock exchange platform for Chinese companies to gather investor funding (especially foreign 
funding). More importantly it indicates that Hong Kong still is an important global financial hub for 
Beijing and all its mainland businesses. Mainland companies are not just dominating the financial hub 
but the leading companies at the HKEX in 2020 based on market capitalization are also mostly 
dominated by mainland companies: first as Tencent Holding Ltd. (5409.7 HKD), second as Alibaba Group 
Holding Ltd. (5034.65 HKD), third as Meituan (1733.42 HKD), fourth as China Construction Bank 
Corporation (1416.06 HKD) (Slotta, 2021). These four companies’ capitalization added together is about 
2.5 times or more than double the capitalization of the rest of the top ten companies combined (of 
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which most of these are also mainland companies). Mainland China stocks had been taking over Hong 
Kong slowly over the years and it has certainly dominated how Hong Kong’s economy functions now.  
 Another important analysis is that there has been a downside for mainland China in terms of the 
HKEX market turnover of the securities (the higher the share turnover, the more liquid company shares 
are) as it has been unpredictable. In other words, how often people buy and sell the stocks at the HKEX 
has little correlation from previous years. For example, the turnover rate in 2013 is 15.26%, in 2014 it’s 
17.16, in 2015 it’s 26.09, in 2016 it’s 16.4, in 2017 it’s 21.71, in 2018 it’s 26.42%, in 2019 it’s 21.44%, and 
in 2020 it’s 32.11% (Slotta, 2021). Note that each time a protest happens the stock market of Hong Kong 
is greatly affected before it goes back up. The Umbrella Movement happened in 2014 and 2014’s 
turnover rate showed minimal increase (1.9%) from the turnover rate of 2013. The Mong Kok Protest in 
2016 caused the market turnover rate from 2015’s 26.09% to just 16.4% at the end of 2016. When the 
2019 protest started the market turnover fell from 26.42% in 2018 to 21.44% at the end of 2019. While 
2020 shows a market turnover rate of 32.11%, the highest it has been in years, it is still clear that 
protests in Hong Kong is strongly related to how the market performs, which means in order for the 
largest mainland companies to continue to be successful in gaining foreign investment the CCP must 
stabilize Hong Kong’s political situation. Of course, the CCP realizes that the dependent relation with 
Hong Kong’s stock market must end or gain full control of the operations of Hong Kong.  
 The CCP had been innovative in alleviating the above issue for some time, even before the 
return of Hong Kong to China. First, Beijing invested in creating special economic zones (SEZs). Willem 
van Kemenade, freelance journalist for the major Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad, said in his book, 
China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Inc.: 
To further China’s dual goals of reintegration with Taiwan and Hong Kong and acceleration of 
outward economic development, four special economic zones were established in the 
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southeastern coastal belt near Hong Kong and Taiwan… If they lived up to their high 
expectations, the SEZs were destined to become showplaces of high technology, modern 
management, and efficiency. Production was meant to serve the foreign market, with the aim of 
raking in foreign currency, in its turn to pay for the import of high technology. This experience 
would then seep out to the hinterland, leading to the proliferation of advanced industrial 
estates (van Kemenade, 1998).  
The first four SEZs established in 1980 were Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen. These zones were 
exempt from administrative interference from local authorities, received large amounts of government 
funding for infrastructure projects, and were allowed to extend special privileges to foreign investors 
such as tax exemptions of up to five years and the permanent lowering of taxes depending on the type 
of technology. Tax rates outside the zones was 20% compared to 15% for businesses inside. This 
attracted a lot of attention from investors, especially Shenzhen. Shenzhen’s GDP in 2019 was 2692.7 
billion RMB (416.51 billion USD), just below Shanghai and Beijing. The annual growth rate of Shenzhen’s 
GDP has been above 0% for the past decade with the highest in 2010 at 12.3% growth. Even before 
these results, in 1984, the SEZ economic model was already deemed successful and could be expanded 
further to fourteen coastal port cities by the CCP. By 1992, sixty SEZs have been set in China and by 
2005, there were 210 national development zones along with 1,346 provincial development zones 
(Rodrigue, 2021). Since China’s geography of production is strongly coordinated with its proximity to 
coastal areas and its capabilities of utilizing ports and airport terminals to access global markets, the 
importance of Hong Kong to the CCP has dramatically devalued over time. Van Kemenade also said in his 
book, “Hong Kong, which had been China’s most important source of foreign currency since the 1950s, 
now became the base par excellence from which to make the great leap toward the fabulous Chinese 
market of which the West had dreamed for more than a hundred years” (van Kemenade, 1998, p.61). 
China has learned from Hong Kong and Taiwan’s success and through trial and error have indeed made a 
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great leap toward the fabulous Chinese market, a very important milestone in becoming an 
acknowledge global superpower.  
 Secondly, to alleviate the Hong Kong dependency, China opened stock market platforms of their 
own in the mainland. Yiu-wai Chu, director of the Hong Kong Studies Program and professor of Modern 
Languages and Cultures at the University of Hong Kong, said, “One of the major problems is that both 
transitional corporation and Hong Kong itself have agreed that it is essential to keep Hong Kong as it is in 
term of its social, legal, and capitalist systems after 1997, and Mainland China did not dispute this 
notion. In reality, Hong Kong will not have any niche over Mainland cities in the long run if they continue 
to open up their markets” (Chu, 2013, p.164). As the mainland continues to open, mainland Chinese 
companies start relying on the Hong Kong market less, which means Hong Kong becomes less of an 
unpredictable liability to the CCP’s plans of future development. On December 1st, 1990, Shenzhen 
opened its Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and Shanghai’s Shanghai Stock Exchange reopened on 
December 19th of the same year. In 2019 the GDP of Hong Kong was 2865.68 billion HKD or 368.68 
billion USD, while Shanghai’s GDP was 3815.5 billion RBM or 590.44 billion USD and Shenzhen’s GDP was 
2692.7 billion RBM or 416.69 billion USD (Textor, 2020; Textor, 2021). Willem van Kemenade in 1998 
said, “Now, in the 1990s, there is little doubt that Shanghai will eventually overtake Hong Kong in terms 
of sheer economic power, but it is difficult to imagine it ever acquiring the sophistication, the symbiosis 
of East and West, the civil order and legal security, and the freedom of information that Hong Kong now 
enjoys” (van Kemenade, 1998, p.57). It is evident that China’s mainland economic development is 
surpassing Hong Kong and that is just two of China’s many special economic zones. While Shengzhen 
and Shanghai are the only ones to have a well-established stock exchange platforms so far, these two 
cities show exceptional economic success. Through the example of these two cities other cities in the 
mainland can potentially create their own stock exchange platforms as well. Although the chances may 
not be high in the next decade, but this possibility cannot be dismissed. With SEZs helping the mainland 
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develop, Hong Kong is becoming less significant to the CCP as their economic importance has 
deteriorated over time. Hong Kong’s economic development speed in comparison to China’s new 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) is much slower at this point. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine SEZs ever 
“acquiring the sophistication, the symbiosis of East and West, the civil order and legal security, and the 
freedom of information that Hong Kong now enjoys” as van Kemenade says. However, without Hong 
Kong’s current freedoms will Hong Kong be any different from these SEZs? The answer remains to be 
answered in the future, but as Hong Kong’s freedoms are stripped the aspects that make Hong Kong a 
special global financial hub also disappears over time.  
Conclusion 
 China never intended to honor the agreement of democracy with Hong Kong until 2047. The 
politically troublesome Hong Kong is no longer worth the CCP’s patience. In this thesis I have analyzed 
why China had minimal intentions of allowing Hong Kong to remain autonomous and democratic 
following the 1997 turn over from Britain. With the current economic power dynamic between Hong 
Kong and mainland China, China is unlikely to return the freedoms taken from Hong Kong such as the 
freedom of the press, speech, and assembly. Since the 1997 turnover, many scholarly articles and books 
had advised Hong Kong people of their dire position if China continues to open up the mainland for 
foreign businesses. These shifts threaten the very foundation of Hong Kong’s economic advantage over 
the mainland. Scholars such as Yiu-Wai Chu, Joseph Y.S. Cheng, William van Kemenade, Ming Sing, and 
Yongshun Cai, all provide convincing evidence as to why political freedoms in Hong Kong are steadily 
eroding in the face of an organized and determine CCP and in the context of China’s economic rise over 
the past several decades. Through analysis of how China increased its political presence in Hong Kong, 
added new laws/ amendments to Hong Kong’s government, and diminished the freedoms of the Hong 
Kong people, I found that China is slowly changing the Hong Kong democratic governing system from the 
inside out. Instead of giving Hong Kongers voting rights in new laws and in choosing their governor, it is 
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simpler and more efficient for the CCP to directly control the Hong Kong government, which includes the 
Hong Kong police force.  
 In addition, using comparisons of Hong Kong’s recent GDP and stock market platforms with that 
of mainland China’s, I found that Hong Kong is no longer as powerful nor as important to the Chinese 
government as it was at the time of the handover. Hong Kong waited too long to attempt to break free 
from China’s communist rule. It is likely that, moving forward, Hong Kong’s title as a global financial hub 
will not give the island any advantage over the mainland cities, nor will it receive any favoritism from the 
CCP. In the meantime, while the streets of Hong Kong have been cleaned up and certain areas are 
renovated to what it looked like before the violent protests, the economic and social impact is still 
visible. Hong Kong has been divided into pro-democracy and pro-government. A government system is 
only as strong as the people’s unity and trust. If the people of Hong Kong are not united, then it is more 
likely that Hong Kong’s political system will further deteriorate and succumb to the coordinated tactics 
of the Chinese Communist Party to solidify mainland control of the island. For Hong Kong to reclaim 
some of its lost freedoms, the people must realize their dire position in power and reframe from pushing 
the CCP too far politically until Hong Kong becomes more economically important to Beijing again. 
Further study and analysis of Hong Kong’s struggling democratic institutions are required, such as what 
freedoms Hong Kong are still allowed to enjoy. Perhaps studies of Hong Kong’s culture and other aspects 
that make the island unique will bring light to how Hong Kong can utilize these advantages to regain or 
even out the sense of important lost through economic means. It must not be ignored that there is a 
chance that the democracy of Hong Kong will be completely dismantled by the CCP. Moreover, foreign 
nations in time must acknowledge China’s undeniable status as a global superpower.  
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